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1 Introduction
Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are banks’ main accrual, over which managers have considerable
discretion. Managers can use this discretion either opportunistically to smooth income (i.e.
manage earnings) or to convey private information to investors (Beatty, Ke & Petroni 2002,
Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Mathieu 2003, Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Yang 2004, Kanagaretnam,
Lim & Lobo 2010). Under Basel I, reducing LLPs allows managers to increase earnings,
regulatory capital, and thereby the market valuation of the bank (Kim & Kross 1998). The
Basel II Capital Accord, effective since 2008, introduces a countervailing link between LLPs
and regulatory capital. In this paper we investigate whether this new regulation affects the
market valuation of the discretionary part of LLPs.
Basel II has sparked substantial debate and scholarly interest in recent years regarding,
among others, internal risk rating systems (Jacobson, Lindé & Roszbach 2006), the potential
pro-cyclical effect of the regulation on lending cycles (Gordy & Howells 2006, Heid 2007),
proposals for forward-looking modeling of default probabilities (Pederzoli & Torricelli 2005),
or country-specific differences in the implementation of the new regulation (Barth, Caprio
& Levine 2008, Herring 2007). In contrast, the effect of Basel II on banks’ provisioning
practices has not received attention so far. As documented in the extant literature, changes
in banking or accounting regulation affecting banks’ provisioning practices have an impact
also on the informativeness of banks’ discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) and their
market valuation. For example, Moyer (2006) finds evidence that banks make accounting
adjustments in order to follow capital adequacy guidelines. Consistent with this, Kim &
Kross (1998) find that Basel I introduces an incentive for banks to reduce LLPs in order
to increase both net income and regulatory capital. In turn, Ahmed, Takeda & Thomas
(1999) find that after the adoption of Basel I, banks use LLPs to manage capital but not
earnings. Likewise, Kilic, Lobo, Ranasinghe & Sivaramakrishnan (2013) demonstrate that
the change in accounting regulation implied by the introduction of Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 133 increases the reliance on DLLPs for income smoothing
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and therefore reduces their market valuation.
Basel II aims to have a significant impact on banks’ provisioning practices. It differ-
entiates banks according to their approach to minimum capital requirements into Internal
Ratings Based (IRB) and Standardized banks. It also makes it less attractive for the prior
ones to use the discretion in provisioning implied by International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS) in order to smooth income via income-increasing (negative) discretionary loan
loss provisions (DLLPs). While under Basel I, a decrease in banks’ LLPs resulted for all
banks in both an increase in earnings and capital ratio1, the adoption of Basel II requires
IRB banks to compute a forward-looking measure of expected loss on their loan portfolio
and to deduct the difference between this expected measure and the actual (accounting)
LLPs from their regulatory capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004). Thus,
whereas the incentive to smooth income for Standardized banks does not change with the
adoption of Basel II, every additional Euro of income-increasing DLLPs reduces the regula-
tory capital of IRB banks by (1- tax rate) (1-d) Euros, where d is the dividend payout ratio.
By introducing a direct relation between LLPs and the level of regulatory capital, Basel II
aims at strengthening IRB banks’ capital solvency, as it lowers their incentive for income
smoothing through an opportunistic use of income-increasing DLLPs. Therefore, with the
adoption of Basel II, IRB banks should rely less on DLLPs for the purpose of smooth-
ing income as this makes compliance with the solvency requirements difficult. Thus the
DLPs of IRB banks should exhibit a heightened informational content for financial market
participants.
Extant evidence suggests that the less opportunistic DLLPs are, the higher is their
market valuation (Wahlen 1994). For instance, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo (2009)
find that the valuation of DLLPs depends on auditor reputation, which is inversely related
to the opportunistic use of DLLPs. Hence, Basel II should lead to an increase in the market
1More precisely, the 1990 Basel I Capital Accord defines General loan loss provisions (GLLPs) as provi-
sions set aside to cover expected “but not yet incurred” losses. These GLLPs thus contain forward-looking
information on a bank’s future credit losses (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011)). According to Basel I, they
are not part of Tier 1 capital and they can only be included directly in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of
1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for banks whose GLLPs exceed this threshold, a decrease
in LLPs results in an increase in both earnings and capital ratio.
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valuation of IRB banks’ DLLPs.
We draw on a sample of 103 listed banks from 24 European countries for the years
2006 to 2011 and use a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design to test our hypotheses.
Since many of the variables necessary to study the impact of Basel II on the valuation of
DLLPs are not available from public databases, such as BVD Bankscope, we hand-collect
much of our data. This results in a unique data set that allows us to test our hypotheses
using empirical models which so far have only been used for U.S. samples, where data is
more readily available than in Europe.
In order to investigate whether the adoption of Basel II has affected the market valuation
of IRB banks’ DLLPs, we perform the following three tests. We first estimate DLLPs
as the residuals of a regression of LLPs on all their normal determinants (as in Wahlen
1994, Adams, Carow & Perry 2009, Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). Further, we follow Cohen,
Dey & Lys (2008) and split DLLPs into income-increasing and income-decreasing ones. In
line with our expectations, after the adoption of Basel II, income-increasing DLLPs are
lower for IRB relative to Standardized banks. Since Standardized banks are not affected
by the new prudential regulations, they can serve as a control group in our difference-
in-difference design. This finding raises the question whether the reduction in income-
increasing DLLPs translates into a lower level of opportunistic reporting, proxied by income
smoothing behavior.
Therefore, in a second step, we test the effect of the adoption of Basel II on the as-
sociation between LLPs and earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT) for IRB and
Standardized banks. Consistent with our prediction, the level of income smoothing through
DLLPs is significantly lower in the post- than in the pre-Basel II period for IRB relative
to Standardized banks. This suggests that Basel II discourages managers of IRB banks
to recognize opportunistic DLLPs, which is in line with banking regulators’ objective of
ensuring the long-term financial stability of banks (Borio, Furfine & Lowe 2001, Laeven &
Majnoni 2003).
The economic climate prevailing in the year of adoption of Basel II represents a notable
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challenge for the empirical test of our hypotheses. Fudenberg & Tirole (1995) and DeFond
& Park (1997) argue that in times of economic hardship, income-increasing activities are
more prevalent, due to concerns about job security and management credibility. Thus, given
the economic crisis we should find that all banks engage in more income-increasing activities
following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007.2 Indeed we find that Standardized
banks recognize more income-increasing DLLPs, and smooth income more after the adoption
of Basel II, which is a normal response to economic turmoil (as documented in Liu &
Ryan 2006). Unlike Standardized banks, IRB banks need to comply with Basel II, which
curbs their ability to smooth income through income-increasing DLLPs in the post-Basel II
period. As expected, our results confirm that IRB banks do not increase their opportunistic
reporting after 2008. This indicates that our results are attributable to the change in
banking regulation rather than to the economic crisis.
In a third step, we regress stock returns on DLLPs to investigate whether DLLPs are
valued more by the market, given the impact of Basel II on both income-increasing DLLPs
and income smoothing. We find that the post-adoption DiD coefficient of DLLPs is positive
and significant, suggesting that the market assigns a higher valuation to the DLLPs of
IRB banks after the adoption of Basel II. The positive association between the returns and
IRB banks’ DLLPs in the post-Basel II period sends a two-fold message to financial market
participants. First, DLLPs contain more information regarding future expected losses, which
is incorporated in stock prices by the market, consistent with previous literature (such as
Wahlen 1994, Beaver & Engel 1996). Second, the lesser reliance on DLLPs for income-
smoothing purposes also tells investors that in times of financial distress IRB banks are
more likely to maintain capital solvency, which is positively valued by investors (Huizinga
& Laeven 2012).
We perform a number of robustness tests on our results. First, in our estimations we
control for the impact of macroeconomic variables on loan loss provisions. We check the
robustness of our findings to the use of different time windows. A set of placebo tests
2The beginning of the economic crisis is often associated with the rapid rise in interbank interest rates
in the U.S. on August 9, 2007.
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confirm that the effect we find is due to the new regulation and not to possible confounding
factors. Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative control
group, composed of U.S. commercial banks instead of Standardized banks.
Our findings contribute to the banking literature and provide policy implications for
banking and accounting regulators. In particular, we show that a change in prudential
regulation aiming at furthering financial stability has a significant impact on IRB banks’
provisioning practices and heightens the informational content and the market valuation of
the DLLPs of IRB banks. The results of our study inform the debate about the effects
and merits of Basel II and the potential implications of Basel III. Moreover, these results
are relevant for accounting regulators and practitioners in the context of the introduction of
IFRS 9 in 2018. This new accounting standard introduces a one year horizon forward-looking
expected credit loss model, which conforms to the requirements of Basel II. Therefore, we
offer accounting regulators early evidence about the relevance of IFRS 9 from the perspective
of investors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our hypotheses.
We present our empirical methodology in Section 3, and our data in Section 4. Section
5 discusses our results and Section 6 our robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 presents our
conclusions.
2 Hypotheses
General loan loss provisions (GLLPs) are provisions set aside to cover expected “but not
yet incurred” losses. By construction, they contain forward-looking information on a bank’s
future credit losses (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011). According to the 1990 Basel I
Capital Accord, GLLPs are not part of Tier 1 capital and they can only be included directly
in Tier 2 capital up to a proportion of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted capital. Therefore, for
banks whose GLLPs exceed this threshold, a decrease in LLPs results in an increase in
both earnings and capital ratio. More specifically, a reduction in LLPs of 1 Euro leads to
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an increase in earnings of (1-tax rate) Euros. This has an indirect effect of (1- tax rate)
(1-d) Euros on Tier 1 capital, where d is the dividend payout ratio, through the channel
of retained earnings.3 Hence, under Basel I, banks have an incentive to engage in income-
increasing activities and reduce LLPs, since this achieves the double objective of increasing
net income and regulatory capital (Kim & Kross 1998).
This incentive to understate LLPs under Basel I is further strengthened by the account-
ing regulation in place in Europe. IFRS, through IAS 39 Financial Instruments prohibits
the recognition of GLLPs altogether, so banks cannot include GLLPs in Tier 2 capital, the
channel through which provisioning could directly influence the level of regulatory capital.
Basel I also prohibits inclusion of any other types of provisions other than GLLPs , even if
they were allowed by accounting regulations. Thus, by prohibiting GLLPs, IFRS cut the
only link recognized under Basel I from LLPs to regulatory capital.
Under IFRS banks can exercise their discretion in provisioning by recognizing collective
LLPs. Collective provisions are set for “incurred but not yet reported (not yet observed)”
losses (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s 2012), which are similar to provisions recognized for the
“expected but not yet incurred” losses (GLLPs) that IFRS prohibits (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s
2004). Banks have the possibility to use their discretion and recognize collective LLPs, but
according to Basel I, only provisions created for losses not yet identified may be included
in Tier 2 capital. Specific and collective provisions cannot be included in Tier 2 capital,
because they do not cover “not-incurred” losses.4 Thus, in the pre-Basel II period, banks
have no incentive to increase their provisions, because this would decrease their earnings
and concurrently decrease their Tier 1 capital. Instead, banks have an incentive to register
3Banks include their retained earnings in Tier 1 capital. Specifically, Tier 1 capital consists of common
stock, retained earnings, capital reserves and capital surplus. Tier 2 capital consists of revaluation reserves,
preferred undisclosed reserves, subordinated debt, GLLPs (under Basel I) and hybrid capital instruments.
4“General provisions or general loan-loss reserves are created against the possibility of losses not yet
identified. Where they do not reflect a known deterioration in the valuation of particular assets, these
reserves qualify for inclusion in Tier 2 capital. Where, however, provisions or reserves have been created
against identified losses or in respect of an identified deterioration in the value of any asset or group of subsets
of assets, they are not freely available to meet unidentified losses which may subsequently arise elsewhere
in the portfolio and do not possess an essential characteristic of capital. Such provisions or reserves should
therefore not be included in the capital base.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1991, paragraph
18, p. 5)
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income-increasing (negative) DLLPs, in order to keep their LLPs small.
In contrast, Basel II allows for collective provisions to be used for the purpose of increas-
ing regulatory capital for banks that adopt the IRB approach. Basel II differs from Basel
I in that it divides banks according to their internal risk management systems into IRB
and Standardized ones, and it adjusts their capital requirements accordingly. The IRB ap-
proach is characterized by internally determined risk measurement and high differentiation
in required capital between riskier and safer credits.5 The Standardized approach is imple-
mented by banks with less developed internal risk management systems. Their credit risk
and the size of their capital requirements are measured based on external credit assessments
from ratings agencies.
The IRB approach generally results in a lower capital charge, and thus banks have strong
incentives to adopt it. In order to become IRB, banks need to apply to their national regula-
tors and show that they have the technical capacity to accurately measure the credit risk of
their portfolio in-house. The costs of setting up such a sophisticated IRB risk management
system are extremely high. This means that in practice, banks segment naturally into large
banks that adopt the IRB approach and smaller banks that stay with the Standardized ap-
proach (see e.g. Hakenes & Schnabel 2011). To alleviate potential concerns of endogeneity
due to the choice between Standardized and IRB banks, we include bank fixed effects and
control for size in our empirical work.6
For Standardized banks, Basel II does not change the regulatory treatment of LLPs.
Nonetheless, the post-2008 period is marked by increased economic turmoil due to the onset
of the financial crisis. According to previous studies, managers are more likely to perform
income-increasing activities and smooth earnings during economic downturns (Fudenberg &
Tirole 1995, DeFond & Park 1997). Given this incentive and the fact that the provisioning
5Basel II divides IRB banks even further into Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB. However, these two
options do not differ with respect to the computation of capital requirements. For simplicity, we therefore
refer to both options in the following as IRB.
6Bank fixed effects will address the potential effect of all unobserved time-invariant variables on the
choice between the status of Standardized and IRB banks. As these determinants do not vary much over
time, given that the choice of becoming IRB is unlikely to get reverted, we believe this addresses most of
the selection issue.
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of Standardized banks is not affected by the adoption of Basel II, we expect that they will
engage in more income-increasing activities after 2008. Whereas IRB banks are subjected
to similar incentives due to macroeconomic conditions, their income-increasing activities
are constrained by the adoption of Basel II. According to the new Capital Accord, they are
required to cover all expected losses with specific and/or collective LLPs (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2004). Regulatory capital under Basel II is only supposed to cover
unexpected losses. Any difference between provisions and expected losses has to be covered
with regulatory capital. More specifically, IRB banks need to compute expected losses
on a one year horizon and to compare this amount with actual (accounting) LLPs. The
difference has to be covered with 50 percent Tier 1 and 50 percent Tier 2 capital. Thus,
when performing income-increasing activities, IRB banks face the risk of suffering capital
pressures.
Like Cohen et al. (2008), we decompose DLLPs into income-increasing (negative) and
income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs and separately analyze the effect of the change in reg-
ulation on each component. Separating negative from positive DLLPs is important to
understand how reporting responds to regulatory requirements. Basel II introduces an in-
centive to narrow the gap between actual LLPs and expected losses, which can be reduced
either by decreasing negative DLLPs (in absolute terms) or by increasing positive DLLPs.
As documented by Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo (2010), due to their positive impact
on earnings, income-increasing DLLPs are more likely to be driven by opportunistic motives
(earnings management) than income-decreasing DLLPs. In order to close the gap between
LLPs and expected losses and avoid a reduction in regulatory capital, banks have an in-
centive to reduce their opportunistic DLLPs, as a result of the new regulation. Since the
new capital requirements apply only to the banks following the IRB approach, we expect a
decrease in the absolute value of income-increasing DLLPs for these banks relative to the
Standardized banks. This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.A. Income-increasing DLLPs decrease after the adoption of Basel II for IRB
relative to Standardized banks.
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According to Hypothesis 1.A, we expect that Basel II will lead IRB banks to narrow the
gap between actual LLPs and expected losses by reducing income-increasing DLLPs relative
to Standardized banks. In principle, they could achieve the same result by recognizing
more income-decreasing DLLPs. However, if banks choose to strategically increase positive
DLLPs and build up "cookie-jar" reserves, they will have to revert them in future periods by
recognizing income-increasing DLLPs. They will then incur high regulatory capital costs.
Thus, at best, this is only a short-term solution and it will not close the gap between actual
LLPs and expected losses in the long run. This option becomes even less likely in the light
of Hypothesis 1.A, which already predicts a reduction in income-increasing DLLPs. The
mechanical relationship between income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs in the
long run implies that any discretionary reporting based on accruals needs to be reverted in
future periods.7 Thus, we expect that given the strong incentive to reduce income-increasing
DLLPs under Basel II, in the long run IRB banks will also reduce their income-decreasing
DLLPs, relative to Standardized banks. Given our short-term window of analysis, we have
a mild expectation to find support for the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.B. Income-decreasing DLLPs decrease after the adoption of Basel II for IRB
relative to Standardized banks.
According to Hypotheses 1.A and 1.B, Basel II produces incentives to lower income-
increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs for IRB banks. Hypothesis 2 relates the pre-
to post-adoption difference in DLLPs between IRB and Standardized banks to a lesser
reliance on DLLPs for the purpose of earnings management, proxied by income smoothing.
According to Liu & Ryan (1995) and Liu & Ryan (2006), all else equal, banks prefer smoother
earnings.
Nonetheless, extant research suggests that banks adjust their income smoothing behavior
to regulatory pressure. For instance, Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011) find that the
adoption of IFRS lowers banks’ incentives to use discretion in provisioning, leading to an
understatement of LLPs and reduced levels of income smoothing. We expect a similar effect
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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for Basel II. As already outlined, the adoption of Basel II provides IRB banks with a strong
incentive to fill the gap between incurred and expected losses. As a reaction to the capital
pressure imposed on them under Basel II, banks no longer have incentives to use their
discretion over the recognition of collective provisions in order to understate DLLPs. This
may affect the level of income smoothing via DLLPs.
Two possible takes on this impact are plausible. On the one hand, given Basel II’s capital
pressure, banks may recognize more positive DLLPs and simply “mechanically” smooth their
income by incorporating future expected losses into earnings, see Gebhardt & Novotny-
Farkas (2011) for a related discussion on LLPs and IFRS. On the other hand, under the
threat of decreasing their regulatory capital by the gap in provisioning, IRB banks may rely
less on the mostly opportunistic income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes.
This is because in terms of regulatory capital income smoothing through DLLPs becomes
more “expensive” after the adoption of Basel II. Table 1 summarizes the regulatory changes
and their implications. Hence, for IRB banks, the opportunistic recognition of income-
increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes should be less prevalent after the adoption
of Basel II.
However, after 2008, banks’ incentives to smooth earnings are further affected by the
onset of the financial crisis. According to previous research, banks smooth their earnings
more in times of economic turmoil (Liu & Ryan 1995). Therefore, both Standardized and
IRB banks have an incentive to smooth their earnings in the post-adoption period. Since
the regulatory pressure introduced by the new Capital Accord does not apply to the pro-
visioning of Standardized banks (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011), their recognition of
income-increasing DLLPs for income smoothing purposes is solely driven by the effect of
the economic crisis. Thus, given the asymmetric impact of Basel II on the two groups, only
the Standardized are expected to manage their earnings more in the post-adoption period.
Therefore, relative to these banks, the income smoothing of IRB banks via DLLPs should
decrease with the adoption of Basel II, which leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Income smoothing through DLLPs decreases after the adoption of Basel II
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for IRB relative to Standardized banks.
Accruals in general and DLLPs in particular, contain both an informational and a
non-informational component. Since LLPs represent banks’ main accruals, by construc-
tion DLLPs should reflect information about future loan defaults (Beaver & Engel 1996,
Wahlen 1994, Kilic et al. 2013). Consequently, their market valuation will be low if they
are perceived as driven by opportunistic motives (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009, Lennox &
Park 2006, Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan 2012). Through the incurred loss approach of
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, IFRS discourages managers to incorporate
their private information regarding expected loan losses into DLLPs (Gebhardt & Novotny-
Farkas 2011). As a result, managers are prevented from disclosing their expectations regard-
ing foreseeable losses, and they are likely to end up communicating less information to the
market through DLLPs. Nonetheless, they can make use of collective provisions to increase
the variability in DLLPs. This can be done either to enhance the informational component
of banks’ DLLPs or to attain opportunistic objectives by inflating the non-informational
component of DLLPs. Basel II provides IRB banks with an incentive to avoid understating
DLLPs through income-increasing activities. The incentive to reduce the largely opportunis-
tic income-increasing DLLPs (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009) should lead to increased valuation
of DLLPs after the adoption of Basel II.
Moreover, according to Huizinga & Laeven (2012), in times of financial distress, such as
the one that prevailed in 2008, when Basel II was implemented, investors positively value
regulations that encourage banks to maintain capital solvency. In line with this effect, if
IRB banks comply with the requirements of Basel II and avoid understating DLLPs they
will not suffer regulatory capital losses. In contrast, if Standardized banks understate their
DLLPs, this will not have a direct impact on their regulatory capital. Provided that IRB
banks do not increase the level of income-smoothing through DLLPs, a positive market
valuation of DLLPs is due to their enhanced informational content regarding future losses
and regarding the banks’ ability to meet capital solvency requirements. Given that Basel
II applies only to IRB banks, we expect to find a change in the market valuation of IRB
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relative to Standardized banks. Based on the extant literature we therefore formulate our
third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The market valuation of DLLPs increases after the adoption of Basel II for
IRB relative to Standardized banks.
3 Empirical models
We test our hypotheses using a panel data method with firm fixed effects in order to control
for the possible effect of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at bank-level, which could
otherwise lead to omitted variable bias and cause endogeneity problems in pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation. Failing to control for bank fixed effects can result in biased
coefficients and misleading conclusions. It should be noted that country fixed effects are
subsumed by bank fixed effects, which are a much stronger control, as they account not only
for differences at the level of the country but also at the level of the individual bank. Given
that our main concern is to shield our estimations from potential endogeneity concerns,
we chose to use firm fixed effects for all models throughout the paper, which is the more
conservative option. In the following subsections we provide a detailed explanation of the
specific models that we estimate to test each one of our hypotheses.
3.1 Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs
In order to determine the impact of Basel II on the level of income-increasing and income-
decreasing DLLPs we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage we follow previous lit-
erature (Wahlen 1994, Kanagaretnam et al. 2004, Kanagaretnam et al. 2009) and estimate
the non-discretionary component of LLPs as the residual of the following OLS regression of
LLPs on their normal determinants:
LLPict = θ0 + θ1NPLict + θ2∆NPLict + θ3Loanict + θ4∆Loanict + θ5NCOict + εict (1)
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where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLPict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by
beginning total assets, NPLict and∆NPLict are, respectively, non-performing loans and their
differences scaled by beginning total assets, Loanict and ∆Loanict, stand for, respectively,
outstanding loans and their differences scaled by beginning total assets, NCOict is net charge-
offs scaled by beginning total assets, and εict is a residual. While there are a number of
possible loan loss provision models (for a detailed discussion, see Beatty & Liao 2014), our
choice is limited by our use of a cross-country sample. Moreover, we refrain from using
specifications that include leads and lags, as this might interfere with our research design
and obscure the comparison of the pre- and post-Basel II periods. We consider as normal
determinants of LLPs the level and change of loans and nonperforming loans (NPLs), as
well as net charge-offs (NCO). Banks are expected to determine the level of LLPs according
to the level of lending. Given the uncertainty regarding the quality of loans, the effect
of change in loans on LLPs is ambiguous (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). In contrast, LLPs
should increase with NPLs, which are an objective measure of portfolio risk (Wahlen 1994).
As changes in NPLs are likely to be serially correlated (Wahlen 1994), they constitute a
good predictor of future losses. We further expect that provisions increase with NCOs, as
the two variables are mechanically related (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). Since our aim is to
control for normal determinants of LLPs, we choose not to include control variables such
as bank size and Tier 1 ratio that do not qualify as normal determinants of LLPs, but are
more likely connected to the discretionary part of LLPs, such as Tier 1 and Size (Ahmed
et al. 1999, Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008).
Table 2 provides further details about our variables. The estimated residual from Equa-
tion (1) is the discretionary part of LLPs, DLLPict ≡ εˆict (Wahlen 1994, Kanagaretnam
et al. 2004, Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). In the second stage we split DLLPs into income-
increasing (negative) and income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs. We further use a DiD design
to test whether IRB banks use their discretion to recognize more or less income-increasing
and income-decreasing DLLPs, relative to Standardized banks, subsequent to the adoption
of Basel II. We build on Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew (2003), Kanagaretnam et al. (2009),
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and the cross-country study of Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo (2010). In addition, we
also include bank fixed effects in our model. This allows us to control for unobserved time-
invariant bank-level heterogeneity. We estimate the following equation to control for the
determinants of DLLPs:
DLLPict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4LLPic,t−1 + θ5EBPTict + θ6Lossict + θ7Sizeict
+θ8Growthict + θ9Tier1ict + θ10GDP Growthct
+θ11∆Unemploymentct + γt + δi + εict,
(2)
where Baselt is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRBi is a dummy for
banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, LLPic,t−1 is lagged
LLPs scaled by beginning total assets, EBPTict is earnings before provisions and taxes
scaled by beginning total assets, Lossict is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income
< 0, and 0 otherwise, Sizeict is bank size, measured as the log of beginning total assets,
Growthict is the growth rate of total assets, Tier1ict is Tier 1 capital scaled by beginning total
assets, GDP Growthct is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product,
∆Unemploymentct is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, γt is a year
dummy, δi is a bank fixed effect, and εict is a residual. Note that in Equation (2) and in the
following, we include Baselt and IRBi for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ1 and
θ2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects and year dummies in the
estimations that include them. Our controls include variables that do not qualify as normal
determinants of LLPs, but are more likely connected to the discretionary part of LLPs, such
as Tier 1 and Size. Due to the incentives for opportunistic reporting that Tier 1 introduces, it
can be considered as one of the main determinants of DLLPs (see Ahmed et al. 1999, Fonseca
& Gonzalez 2008). As for Size, the same explanation holds. Banks of different size are
likely to be subject to different levels of regulatory scrutiny (Beatty & Liao 2014), which
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will result in differences in the level of discretion over provisioning. We also include a Loss
indicator, which accounts for the fact that banks are more likely to manipulate provisions
when their income is negative (see Brown 2001, Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002). We
further include a control for growth in assets, which is associated with abnormal accruals, as
documented in prior research (see Ashbaugh et al. 2003, Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo 2010).
Finally, we control for the effect of the business cycle on provisioning by including GDP
growth (following Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008, Perez, Salas-Fuma & Saurina 2008, Bushman &
Williams 2012, Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Wang 2015) and growth in unemployment (following
Beck & Narayanamoorthy 2013).8
We estimate Equation (2) in turn with the absolute value of income-increasing and
income-decreasing DLLPs as dependent variables. Income-decreasing (positive) DLLPs are
defined as max(DLLPict, 0), whereas income-decreasing (negative) DLLPs are defined as
−min(DLLPict, 0). Note that, according to this convention, both components are positive
so that a decrease in both positive and negative DLLPs implies an overall decrease in dis-
cretionary reporting. Another way to think about this is that the share of LLPs that is
discretionary decreases, or DLLPs become less volatile. Thus a negative DiD coefficient
θ3 in Equation (2) means that, after the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks recognize less
income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs relative to Standardized banks.
3.2 Income smoothing through LLPs
Building on previous literature (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004, Liu & Ryan 2006, Fonseca &
Gonzalez 2008, Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011, Kilic et al. 2013), we estimate income
smoothing as the coefficient relating LLPs to earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT),
after controlling for differences in the amount and type of loans, non-performing loans,
bank size, time dummies, and bank fixed effects. While our interest lies in the effect of
Basel II on DLLPs, which involves regressing the residuals of Equation (1) on the Basel
II dummy, such a two-step approach may lead to an attenuation bias in the second stage
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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coefficients. Therefore, we follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and, in a single step, regress
LLPs simultaneously on their normal determinants and the Basel II dummy. Like Gebhardt
& Novotny-Farkas (2011) we refrain from including taxes as a determinant of discretion in
LLPs. Since in most European countries income taxes are based on individual (statutory)
financial statements and individual tax effects cancel out for consolidated accounts, we do
not expect tax incentives to play a major role.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the adoption of Basel II is associated with a decrease in the
level of income smoothing. In order to determine whether IRB banks smooth income less, we
focus on the relationship between LLPs and EBPT. If banks engage in income smoothing,
they will lower LLPs when EBPT are low and increase them when EBPT are high (Ahmed
et al. 1999, Liu & Ryan 2006). Consequently, a positive association between these variables
is an indicator that banks are smoothing income. We control for the normal determinants
of LLPs in order to test whether the discretionary part of LLPs is associated with EBPT.
We test Hypothesis 2 in the following regression, inspired by Kim & Kross (1998), Ahmed
et al. (1999), Liu & Ryan (2006), and Kilic et al. (2013):
LLPict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4EBPTict + θ5Baselt · EBPTict + θ6IRBi · EBPTict + θ7Baselt · IRBi · EBPTict
+θ8NPLict + θ9∆NPLict + θ10Loanict + θ11∆Loanict + θ12NCOict
+θ13Tier1ict + θ14Sizeict + θ15GDP Growthct
+θ16∆Unemploymentct + θ17HPIct + θ17Term Spreadct + γt + δi + εict.
(3)
where HPIct is the country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return and Term Spreadct is
the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates.
The θ4 coefficient represents the association between LLPs and EBPT, and if positive
and significant, it shows that banks smooth income. θ5 is the incremental effect after
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the adoption of Basel II. If the requirements of Basel II make banks rely less on LLPs to
smooth their income, then θ5 should be negative and significant. Hypothesis 2 implies that
the DiD coefficient θ7, which measures the incremental effect of the Basel II adoption on
the extent to which IRB banks smooth income, is negative. As in Equation (2), we use
NPL, ∆NPL, Loan, ∆Loan, NCO and Size to control for the normal determinants (non-
discretionary part) of LLPs. We expect a positive coefficient for Loan, since the larger the
amount of loans held as assets by a bank, the more LLPs it will have. The change in total
loans outstanding can be positively or negatively related to the level of LLPs, depending
on the riskiness of the loans. Regarding the level of non-performing loans (NPL) and their
change (∆NPL), we expect a positive relation with LLPs, because more non-performing
loans require higher provisioning. We include controls for Tier 1 and Size and with GDP
Growth, ∆Unemployment, House Price Index returns and Term Spread, we account for the
potential impact of the business cycle on loan loss provisioning. Our use of year dummies
and bank fixed effects is consistent with the cross-country studies of Fonseca & Gonzalez
(2008) and Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011).
3.3 Market Valuation of DLLPs
Following Kilic et al. (2013), we measure the market valuation of DLLPs as the coefficient
in a regression of annual stock returns on DLLPs. Like prior literature dealing with the
information content of reported numbers (Tucker & Zarowin 2006), our study assumes
market efficiency. We test Hypothesis 3 using bank fixed effect and year dummies in a
DiD design. Our interest lies in analysing how the association between market returns and
DLLPs changes before and after the adoption of Basel II for IRB versus Standardized banks.
We also allow for a DiD in the effect of EBPT on stock returns in order to make sure that
the adoption of Basel II specifically impacts the valuation of DLLPs and that our results
are not driven by the influence of other confounding effects at the time of the adoption. In
order to test Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following regression model:
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Rict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4DLLPict + θ5Baselt ·DLLPict + θ6IRBi ·DLLPict + θ7Baselt · IRBi ·DLLPict
+θ8EBPTict + θ9Baselt · EBTPict + θ10IRBi · EBTPict + θ11Baselt · IRBi · EBTPict
+θ12∆NPLict + θ13NCOict + γt + δi + εict,
(4)
where Rict is the yearly stock return, computed from the end of the first quarter. Note
that for this estimation, EBTPict, ∆NPLict and NCOict are scaled by beginning market
value of total equity (market capitalization). Our choice of controls is based on the idea
that the market reacts more to the disclosure of bad relative to good news (see Mendenhall
& Nichols 1988, Basu 1997). Non-performing loans (NPL) and net charge-offs (NCO) are
considered bad news for banks and prices are likely to respond to changes in their level.
While Equation (4) builds on the U.S.-based studies of Kilic et al. (2013) and Kanagaretnam,
Lim & Lobo (2010), in addition to year dummies, we also include bank fixed effects in order
to deal with the endogeneity issues, raised by the possible presence of unobserved bank-level
heterogeneity given that we rely on a sample of banks from 24 countries.
If the adoption of Basel II discourages IRB banks from relying on DLLPs to smooth
income, then the reported provisions should become more informative for investors. More-
over, if IRB banks incorporate more forward-looking information regarding expected losses
through the discretionary part of reported LLPs, then the association between returns and
DLLPs should be positive and significant. Specifically, we expect that the DiD coefficient
θ7, which represents the incremental impact of Basel II on IRB banks, is positive and signif-
icant. If the market valuation of LLPs changes after 2008 due to other confounding effects
and not to the impact of Basel II on DLLPs, then θ5 will become significant.
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4 Data description
We test our hypotheses for a broad sample of listed banks in the European Union. We
choose listed banks in the EU as they had to apply Basel II in 2008. This provides us with
a common adoption point to test the impact of Basel II. Second, as all listed banks in the
EU had to adopt IFRS in 2005, we also have a homogeneous pre-Basel II adoption sample
(from 2005 onwards). This homogeneous setting provides a unique opportunity to study
the effect of Basel II relative to the previous banking regulation.
The core financial data stems from the BVD Bankscope database. Given the large
number of missing observations, like Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011), we complete the
data with hand-collected loan loss provisions (LLPs), non-performing loans (NPL), net
charge-offs (NCO), net income, total assets, EBPT and Tier 1, from banks’ annual reports
published on their websites. We start from an initial sample of 284 listed banks in the
EU, available in Bankscope. After eliminating banks with missing financial data that could
not be manually collected with reasonable efforts, we further exclude banks that underwent
mergers or that are subsidiaries of other banks. Finally, we are left with 103 listed banks
from 24 EU countries. This results in 618 bank-year observations. Nonetheless, we loose 80
observations due to missing values for Net Charge-Offs (NCO), the most difficult variable to
collect. In contrast to Kim & Kross (1998), we do not need to exclude voluntary adopters
to avoid biasing our findings, because, to the best of our knowledge, no bank in the sample
adopted the IRB approach of Basel II earlier than 2008. We further obtain stock returns
and market value of equity data from Datastream.
Following Kilic et al. (2013), we restrict our sample in order to focus on the changes
around the adoption year and to avoid the confounding effect of other events. Thus, we
construct a Basel II dummy variable, which takes value 0 in the pre-Basel II period before
2008, and 1 thereafter.9
In order to classify the banks based on the extent to which they are affected by the
adoption of Basel II, we distinguish the 63 banks that follow the IRB approach from the
9We also run our estimations with years 2009-2010 as post-Basel II sample, see Section 4.
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40 banks that apply the Standardized approach. Since Basel II changes incentives for IRB
banks regarding the use of DLLPs, but leaves them unchanged for the banks following the
Standardized approach, we use the latter ones as a control group in testing our hypothe-
ses. Having such a control group helps us distinguish between the effect of Basel II that
affect only IRB banks and any other factors that could affect all banks during that period.
This is particularly important during times of economic turbulence, which render pre-post
comparisons challenging to implement without a control group.
In our sample there are 7 banks (out of 103) that switch from Standardized to IRB after
the adoption of Basel II. In order to mitigate potential identification issues, we keep the late
switchers in the Standardized group during the Basel II adoption period, until the actual
year of their switch to IRB. Thus, if Standardized and IRB banks are structurally different
and our results are driven by effects other than the adoption of Basel II, grouping switchers
with Standardized banks would likely weaken our results by reducing our DiD coefficients.
Thus, our results are robust to this potential identification issue, and our coefficients can be
viewed as lower bounds, since we are considering the case that is least favorable in terms of
finding significant results.10
Table 3 provides summary statistics. The key characteristics of our sample are similar to
those of comparable European samples used in extant literature. Given the differences in the
underlying samples, the mean value for LLPs and NPLs of 0.006 (0.023) for IRB and 0.007
(0.037) for Standardized banks is in line with the mean value of 0.006 for the subsample of
European banks in the study of Fonseca & Gonzalez (2008) and the 0.007 in the sample of
Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011). Moreover, the size of change in Loans in our sample
(0.051 for IRB and 0.072 for Standardized banks) seems to correspond well with the values
of 0.045 in Fonseca & Gonzalez (2008) and of 0.100 in Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011).
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations of our main variables. As in previous literature,
LLPs exhibit significant correlations with EBPT, NPL, and Loans (Kim & Kross 1998,
Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008).
10We also check the robustness of our results by considering late adopters as Standardized during the
whole sample period, see Section 6.
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5 Results
In the following subsections, we analyze the results of the tests of our three hypotheses, and
we discuss further robustness checks.
5.1 Income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs
Table 5 shows the results of the first-step regression of LLPs on their normal determinants,
as per Equation (1). We perform this estimation first for the full sample in Column (1),
and also for a reduced sample in Column (2), which excludes 2008, the adoption year of
Basel II, as well as 2011. We do this in order to eliminate potential implementation issues
with respect to the year of adoption of Basel II. Also, since 2008 coincides with a period of
economic crisis in Europe, we want to test whether our results are robust to the exclusion of
a year of high economic turmoil that might have had an impact on banks’ reported numbers.
Like Kilic et al. (2013) we want to avoid having our analysis biased by confounding events
when using a larger post-adoption window. Moreover, we further exclude 2011 from our
sample, to have a shorter (two-year) and symmetric pre-and post-adoption window. The
residuals of this estimation are the discretionary LLPs, i.e. the part of LLPs that cannot be
attributed to normal determinants. The results from both samples are nearly identical, and
they imply that about 56 percent of the variation in LLPs is due to normal determinants,
while the rest is discretionary.
Further, we split the sample between positive (income-decreasing) and negative (income-
increasing) DLLPs and use Equation (2) to determine whether the Basel II adoption changes
the way IRB and Standardized banks recognize the two types of DLLPs. In Equation (2) the
main coefficient of interest is the interaction between Basel and IRB (θ3). This coefficient
shows whether after the adoption of Basel II, IRB banks recognize incrementally more or
less DLLPs relative to Standardized ones. Table 6 shows the results of the regression of
income-increasing (Columns (1), (3), (5), (7)) and income-decreasing DLLPs (Columns (2),
(4), (6), (8)) on the Basel II dummy, as per Equation (2).
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We perform this estimation with and without time dummies for the full sample and
for the sample that excludes years 2008 and 2011. Using income-increasing DLLPs as
dependent variable, we obtain a negative θ3 coefficient, which is significant at the 5 percent
level. The coefficients in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) imply that, relative to the pre-
adoption period, the magnitude of income-increasing DLLPs of IRB banks becomes 78% of
a standard deviation smaller than that of Standardized banks after Basel II.11
Moreover, the results are remarkably stable across all four estimations, both in the value
of the coefficient and its level of significance. This means that IRB banks reduce the level
of income-increasing DLLPs after the adoption of Basel II, relative to Standardized banks.
Taken together, these results confirm Hypothesis 1.A, as Basel II introduces an incentive for
banks to reduce their income-increasing DLLPs. Specifically, due to the connection between
DLLPs and regulatory capital, IRB banks are likely to rely less on income-increasing DLLPs
for opportunistic reasons in the post-adoption relative to the pre-adoption period. Given
that the regulatory pressure is targeted at IRB banks, finding an incremental impact of
Basel II adoption for these banks confirms our expectations.
With income-decreasing DLLPs θ3 is negative and of the same magnitude as with income-
increasing DLLPs for the whole sample, but it is not significant. This lack of significance is
potentially due to the reduced sample size12 or to the reduced post-Basel II adoption window
in our sample. The reduction in the magnitude of income-decreasing DLLPs corresponds
to 38% of the standard deviation of positive DLLPs, about half the effect we obtain for
negative DLLPs.13 Overall, we thus find very weak support for Hypothesis 1.B.
Regarding the control variables, their coefficients are in line with previous literature.
Lagged LLPs, Size and Tier 1 are positively (negatively) associated with the absolute value
of negative (positive) DLLPs. The coefficient of the Loss variable suggests that when they
suffer losses, banks tend to increase both types of DLLPs. Growth is positively (nega-
11Since the coefficients are based on a fixed-effect estimation, we use the within firm standard deviation
of income-increasing DLLPs, based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with firm effects as only factors.
The result is 0.0014 for income-increasing DLLPs.
12We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
13The within firm standard deviation of income-decreasing DLLPs is 0.0029.
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tively) associated with the absolute value of positive (negative) DLLPs. GDP growth is
negatively and significantly related only to income-decreasing DLLPs, while the change in
unemployment is negative but insignificant for both positive and negative DLLPs.
Our next hypothesis will allow us to determine whether the overall reduction in income-
increasing DLLPs leads to an incremental reduction in the level of opportunistic reporting
in IRB banks, proxied by income smoothing through LLPs.
5.2 Income smoothing through LLPs
Table 7 reports results for the income smoothing regressions of LLPs on EBPT, for the whole
sample in Columns (1), (2) and (3), and for the reduced sample excluding 2008 and 2011 in
Columns (4), (5) and and (6). As in the previous subsection, we do this in order to check
the robustness of our results to a shorter post-adoption time window. In this subsection, we
are interested in measuring the effect of Basel II adoption on the discretionary part of LLPs,
which we obtain as the residual of the regression of LLPs on their normal determinants, as
per Equation (1). However, regressing DLLPs on the Basel II dummies and interactions
involves a two-step approach, where the residuals of the first equation are used as dependent
variable in a second stage regression. In order to avoid an attenuation bias on the coefficients
of the second stage, we follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and regress LLPs simultaneously
on their normal determinants and on the Basel II variables, as in Equation (3). Thus, by
controlling for the normal determinants of LLPs, we actually assess the association between
DLLPs and EBPT without the econometric problems posed by a two-stage regression.
Hypothesis 2 deals with the impact of Basel II adoption on the level of opportunistic
reporting, as proxied by income smoothing through DLLPs. The association between DLLPs
and EBPT indicates that banks use DLLPs to reach their income smoothing objectives. The
coefficient of interest is θ7 in Equation (3), as it measures the incremental impact of Basel
II on income smoothing behavior of IRB relative to Standardized banks. If Basel II reduces
the opportunistic use of income-increasing DLLPs for IRB relative to Standardized banks,
then we should find that the level of income smoothing for the former is significantly lower
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relative to the latter sample.
The coefficient θ7 of the interaction of Basel IRB and EBPT is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level in all specified models, which confirms Hypothesis 2.
Again, our coefficient is remarkably stable across different time periods and is unaffected
by the inclusion of year dummies. The magnitudes of the effects imply that a one standard
deviation change in EBPT leads to a reduction of about 20% of a standard deviation in
LLPs in IRB compared to Standardized banks after Basel II adoption.14
The coefficient on the interaction between IRB and EBPT, θ6 is not significant in any
of our estimations. This lack of statistical significance suggests that there are no pre-
intervention differences between the IRB and Standardized banks, which lends support to
our choice of the control sample. However, the coefficient of the interaction between Basel
and EBPT, θ5, is positive and significant in all specifications. This suggests that, after
2008, as a reaction to the economic turmoil due to the onset of the financial crisis, banks
smooth earnings more. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Fudenberg &
Tirole (1995) and the empirical findings of DeFond & Park (1997), Liu & Ryan (1995)
and Liu & Ryan (2006), that managers are more likely to smooth earnings in times of
economic hardship. While Standardized banks smooth income significantly more after 2008,
IRB banks refrain from doing so, given the link introduced by Basel II between income
smoothing and regulatory capital. While it decreases in all specifications, an F-test of the
null hypothesis that θ5 + θ7 = 0 reveals that the level of income-smoothing of IRB banks
does not change significantly after the implementation of Basel II. The signs of our control
variables are consistent with our expectations and with previous research. As far as the non-
discretionary determinants of LLPs are concerned, Loans are positively and significantly
associated with LLPs in the whole sample, while the change in loans is negatively and
significantly associated with provisions in all estimations. Both the level and change in NPL
are positively associated with LLPs (Kilic et al. 2013) and they are significant (Gebhardt
& Novotny-Farkas 2011). As far as discretionary determinants of LLPs are concerned, Size
14The within firm standard deviation is 0.0053 for EBPT and 0.0052 for LLPs, and the effect varies
between 20% in Column (3) and 22% in Column (4).
24
and Tier 1 do not seem to have a significant impact on LLPs. Our results suggest that LLPs
increase when the macroeconomic situation deteriorates: LLPs are higher when GDP growth
is low, when unemployment increases, and when the term spread, which is a predictor of
recessions (Estrella & Mishkin 1998), increases. House price Index returns do not seem to
be systematically related to LLPs in our sample.15
5.3 Market valuation of DLLPs
Hypothesis 3 deals with the impact of Basel II adoption on the market valuation of DLLPs.
We expect that after the adoption of Basel II, there is an incremental increase in the level of
market valuation of IRB relative to Standardized banks via their DLLPs. Table 8 provides
results of the regression of stock returns on DLLPs. Unlike our previous hypotheses, this
estimation assumes market efficiency (Tucker & Zarowin 2006), as it relies on market prices.
We can faithfully assess the information content of reported numbers only if market prices
are reliable, which is unlikely to be the case in 2008, given the impact of the worldwide
financial crisis. Thus, for this test, we choose to exclude 2008 from the sample. Column
(1) shows our base result, while in Column (2) we include year dummies for robustness.
Consistent with previous literature we find DLLPs positively associated with returns. The
coefficient θ7 of the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is positive and significant at the
1 percent level in Column (1) and at the 5 percent level in Column (2). This indicates
that investors infer additional information regarding future cash-flows from the DLLPs of
IRB banks (Wahlen 1994, Liu & Ryan 2006). In Column (3), as in previous sections, we
eliminate both 2008 and 2011 to check the robustness of our results to a shorter post-Basel
II window. As before, coefficient θ7 of the triple interaction is positive and significant at
the 5 percent level. While its magnitude is hard to interpret, it implies that a one standard
deviation increase in DLLPs leads to an increase of 28%, 16% and 21% of the standard
deviation of returns, respectively for Columns (1), (2) and (3).16
15Our results are robust to interacting macroeconomic variables with an IRB dummy to allow for a
differential impact of the business cycle on IRB and Standardized banks. The results of these estimations
(not reported in the interest of space) are available upon request.
16The within firm standard deviation is 0.0044 for DLLPs and 0.48 for returns.
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Moreover, the coefficient of the IRB*DLLP interaction is not significant in any of our
models, indicating that there are no pre-Basel II adoption differences between the IRB
and Standardized groups. Our results also show that the Basel*DLLP interaction is not
significant, suggesting that there is no change in the valuation of DLLPs in the control group
after Basel II. Following Kilic et al. (2013) we also include double and triple interactions of
EBPT to make sure that the change in the valuation of DLLPs after Basel II is not driven
by other confounding effects. In principle, the relation between EBPT and returns should
not be influenced by the adoption of Basel II. However, if both the market valuation of IRB
banks’ EBPT and DLLPs increase, this could suggest that overall, there has been an increase
in the informativeness of IRB banks’ reported numbers, independently of the implementation
of Basel II. Our results show a negative and significant Basel*EBPT interaction, suggesting
that the market decreases the valuation of EBPT in the post-Basel II period. This is
consistent with less informative earnings in periods of economic turmoil. In contrast, the
positive and significant Basel*IRB*DLLP coefficient suggests that the valuation of DLLPs
increases in the post-Basel II period. Since both variables change in opposite directions, this
makes it very unlikely that the increase in the valuation of DLLPs is due to factors other
than the implementation of Basel II. Moreover, an F-test shows that the DLLPs of IRB
banks increase significantly after the adoption of Basel II, whereas the market valuation of
EBPT decreases significantly only in Column (3) of Table 8.
Overall, our test of Hypothesis 3 confirms that investors view the DLLPs of IRB banks
as more informative after the adoption of Basel II. The positive association between returns
and the DLLPs of IRB banks in the post-2008 period indicates that Basel II sends a two-
fold message to financial market participants. Specifically, DLLPs of IRB banks contain
more information regarding future expected losses and about the banks’ ability to meet
capital solvency requirements, which is incorporated in stock prices by the market. For
Standardized banks, whose provisioning is not affected by the requirements of Basel II, we
find no significant change in the valuation of their DLLPs.
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6 Robustness
In the previous section we show that our results are robust to the exclusion of 2008 and
2011 from our sample. We further discuss the robustness of our results to (1) the issue of
selection into IRB and Standardized, (2) the use of 2007 as a placebo adoption year and (3)
the use of an alternative control sample of listed U.S. commercial banks.
6.1 Selection
We further check the robustness of our results to a modification of the way we handle the
small group of banks that did not adopt IRB from the very beginning, but change status in
the years following the adoption of Basel II. So far we treated late adopters as Standardized
banks up until the actual year of their switch to IRB. We run our tests again, by considering
the banks that switch from the Standardized to the IRB group after the Basel II adoption as
Standardized for the full sample period, even after they switch to IRB. This helps us mitigate
potential identification issues and make sure that our results are not due to differences in the
underlying characteristics and structure of the banks in the two groups. Grouping switchers
with Standardized banks is likely to weaken our results by reducing our DiD coefficients.
The coefficients can be viewed as lower bounds, since we are considering the case that is
least favorable in terms of finding significant results. Our results are robust to the use of this
different definition of IRB banks, which indicates that the change in the market valuation
of the DLLPs of IRB banks is due to the adoption of Basel II.17
6.2 Placebo
The validity of differences in differences (DiD) estimations relies on the parallel trends as-
sumption for the IRB and Standardized groups. While it is difficult to test this assumption
directly, we build on Schnabl (2012), Srivastava (2014) and Chodorow-Reich (2014) and
perform a series of placebo tests. The tests consists in re-estimating our models, but with
17These results are not reported to save space, but they are available upon request.
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an intervention that takes place in 2007, one year before the adoption of Basel II.18 To
confirm our results are due to the impact of Basel II, we expect that in all placebo es-
timations our main coefficients of interest will be insignificant. The results for our three
tests (available upon request) mostly confirm our findings. With the 2007 placebo, we find
no significant effect for either income-increasing or income-decreasing DLLPs. As far as
income-smoothing is concerned, we find no significant Placebo*IRB*EBPT interaction in
any of the specifications. There are significant pre-placebo intervention differences between
the two groups only in the reduced sample, which is possibly due to the fact that there
is only one year left in the pre-adoption period. Moreover, we find a significant change in
income-smoothing in 2007 for Standardized banks in the whole sample, which confirms that
Standardized banks increase the level of income-smoothing as a response to the crisis, one
year before the implementation of Basel II.19 Finally, in the market valuation tests, we find
no significant effect of any of our DLLP interactions, which confirms our main results.
6.3 U.S. control sample
To further check the robustness of our results, we construct a second control sample com-
posed of 63 listed U.S. commercial banks, obtained from BVD Bankscope. In the U.S., banks
were not required to implement Basel II, but continued to apply Basel I throughout our
sample period, like Standardized banks. (see e.g. Dugan & Xi 2011, Getter 2012). Moreover,
compared to the EU, we expect a lower level of income smoothing in the U.S., where the in-
curred loss model has been strictly applied for decades (Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas 2011).
Thus, even if the financial crisis provides them with similar incentives, U.S. banks would
likely smooth their earnings less in the post-Basel II period relative to Standardized banks.
This makes it more difficult for us to find significant results in the comparison of IRB with
U.S. banks. Nevertheless, a significant difference between the behavior of IRB and U.S.
banks strengthens the validity of our results. In contrast, if we find that the IRB and U.S.
18Unfortunately, we have only two years in the pre-adoption period, which leaves us with only that one
year as a possible placebo and a one-year pre-intervention period.
19The beginning of the economic crisis is often associated with the rapid rise in interbank interest rates
in the U.S. on August 9, 2007.
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banks are similarly affected by the post-2008 period, this casts doubt on our main results
and makes it more difficult to attribute the observed effects to the adoption of Basel II. The
last two columns of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on the U.S. sample. Consistent with
Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011), banks in our U.S. control sample are smaller than the
European ones.
Table 9 shows the results of our three main estimations obtained with the U.S. control
group. Overall, in all model specifications the direction and significance of our main coeffi-
cients of interest are similar to the ones in our results with Standardized banks. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on income-increasing and income-decreasing
DLLPs. The magnitude of the effect of Basel on income-increasing DLLPs is very similar
to the one obtained with Standardized banks: a decrease of -0.0016 vs. -0.0011 for the EU
sample, significant at the 5% level in both cases. Like in the EU sample, there is no signifi-
cant effect of Basel II on income-decreasing DLLPs for IRB relative to U.S. banks. Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 9 show the effect of Basel II on banks’ income smoothing. There is a
significantly lower pre-intervention level of income-smoothing for US banks, which is likely
due to the stricter implementation of the incurred loss model in the U.S. (Gebhardt &
Novotny-Farkas 2011). The Basel*EBPT interaction is insignificant in both models, which
means that there is no change in the level of income smoothing of U.S. banks after the
implementation of Basel II. However, the Basel*IRB*EBPT interaction is negative and sig-
nificant at the 5% level in both specifications, and the coefficients are larger than for the
Standardized control group (-0.3 vs. -0.2). Finally, for the market valuation of DLLPs, while
the Basel*IRB*DLLP triple interaction is not significant, in terms of sign and magnitude,
the coefficients are quite similar to the ones we find with the Standardized sample (15 and
23 vs. 30 and 17). Overall, the use of U.S. sample as a control group confirms our results
with the Standardized control group.
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7 Conclusion
We contribute first evidence on the impact of Basel II on the market valuation of DLLPs.
Relative to Standardized, IRB banks reduce their opportunistic reporting as they recognize
less income-increasing DLLPs and rely less on DLLPs to smooth their income. This makes
the DLLPs of IRB banks more informative regarding future losses and banks’ ability to meet
capital solvency requirements and leads to a higher market valuation of DLLPs after the
adoption of Basel II. For Standardized banks, whose provisioning is not affected by Basel
II, we do not find a significant change in the market valuation of DLLPs.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we perform an
empirical analysis of the implications of Basel II adoption on the market valuation of DLLPs.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so and our findings underscore the
impact of banking regulators’ requirements on the provisioning of banks (Moyer 2006).
We contribute to the literature analyzing the impact of changes in banking or accounting
regulation on the informativeness and market valuation of banks’ DLLPs (e.g. Ahmed et al.
1999, Beatty, Chamberlain & Magliolo 1995, Kim & Kross 1998, Kilic et al. 2013). Second,
our findings add to the literature that analyzes the role of discretion in provisioning for
financial reporting outcomes (e.g. Bushman & Williams 2012, Perez et al. 2008). Our
results show that the market values the use of non-opportunistic discretion in provisioning.
This finding adds to the debate regarding the need to improve the incurred loss approach
of IAS 39 (PriceWaterhouseCooper’s 2012).
Our findings are relevant for banking regulators, since our results suggest a need to
examine how the new IFRS 9 (effective as of 2018) will interact with their own changes
in the regulation - namely, the move from Basel II to Basel III in 2019.20 In fact, our
study highlights a strong need for banking and accounting standard setters to coordinate
their efforts. To a certain extent, both may have diverging objectives and their respective
regulations can impair the other party’s ability to reach its goals. We find evidence for
20Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) represents the first step in the implementation of Basel
III in the EU. This regulation was adopted by the EU in 2013. CRD IV applies as of 1 January 2014. Part
of the provisions will be phased-in between 2014 to 2019. (European Parliament 2011)
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just such an effect. Whereas the IFRS – due to the incurred loss approach of IAS 39 – in
combination with the capital regulations of Basel I create an incentive to use opportunistic
income-increasing DLLPs, this incentive disappears with the adoption of Basel II for IRB
banks. The adoption of Basel II thus introduces a counter-acting incentive for IRB banks to
decrease the use of income-increasing DLLPs, typically seen as particularly opportunistic.
Recognizing less income-increasing DLLPs shields the IRB banks from suffering regulatory
capital reductions. This, in turn, contributes to the financial stability of IRB banks in
line with banking regulators’ objectives. Yet, the incentive for using income-increasing
DLLPs still persists for Standardized banks - an aspect recently criticized in the literature
(Rossignolo, Fethi & Shaban 2013). Given the worldwide financial consequences of banking
crises, it is important to provide harmonized regulations and avoid conflicting signals, which
might otherwise lead to high economic ans societal costs.
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Table 1: Effect of LLPs on earnings and regulatory capital under different regulatory regimes for IRB banks
Basel I & IFRS Basel II & IFRS
2005-2008 2008-present
Main changes in regulation
Banks can only include
GLLPs in Tier 2, not other
LLPs
The shortfall between
expected loss and LLPs is to
be deducted 50% from Tier 1
and 50% from Tier 2
Effect of ∆LLP on
earnings
-∆LLP(1-tax rate) -∆LLP(1-tax rate)
Effect of ∆LLP on
regulatory capital
Through retained
earnings
(indirect effect)
Tier 1 -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d) -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d)
Tier 2 0 0
Through regulatory
requirements
(direct effect)
Tier 1 0 +∆LLP/2
Tier 2 0 +∆LLP/2
Total effect (Tier 1 + Tier 2) -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d) +∆LLP(1-(1-tax rate)(1-d))
Overal effect
LLPs decrease earnings and
total regulatory capital
LLPs decrease earnings but
increase total regulatory
capital
This figure shows that the effect of a ∆LLP change in LLPs impacts earnings by its after-tax amount, -∆LLP(1-tax rate).
Further, this change impacts Tier 1 capital by the after-tax and after-dividend amount, -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d), where d is the
dividend payout rate. In the pre-Basel II period, banks have little incentive to recognize positive (income-decreasing) LLPs, since
this will have an adverse impact both on earnings, of -∆LLP(1-tax rate), and on regulatory capital, of -∆LLP(1-tax rate)(1-d).
Basel II modifies the effect of LLPs on regulatory capital by introducing a direct link between LLPs and both Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital of ∆LLP/2 each. This makes the net effect of LLPs on regulatory capital positive with magnitude +∆LLP(1-(1-tax
rate)(1-d)) in the post-Basel II period, thus providing banks with an incentive to increase LLPs, as a result of the new regulation.
The overall effect of the Basel II adoption on the effect of LLPs and regulatory capital is ∆LLP, which depends neither on the
tax rate nor on the dividend payout ratio.
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Table 2: Variable definition
Variable name Explanation
LLPict Loan loss provisions (LLPs) scaled by beginning total assets
DLLPict Absolute value of negative/positive discretionary loan loss provisions
(DLLPs). DLLPs are the residuals of the regression of LLPs on their nor-
mal determinants, as per Equation (1): DLLPict ≡ εˆict, where εˆict is the
estimated residual of Equation (1)
EBPTict Earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning of the year total
assets in Equations (2) and (3), and scaled by beginning market value of
equity (market capitalization), obtained from Datastream, in Equation (4)
Loanict Beginning total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets
∆Loanict Change in total loans outstanding scaled by beginning total assets
NPLict Beginning non-performing scaled by beginning total assets
∆NPLict Change in non-performing loans loans scaled by beginning of the year total
assets in Equations (2) and (3), and scaled by beginning market value of
equity (market capitalization), obtained from Datastream, in Equation (4)
Sizeict Natural logarithm of beginning total assets
Growthict Growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t
Tier1ict Ratio of beginning regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) before loan loss reserves
to the minimum required regulatory capital
Baselt Dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the bank adopted Basel II
and 0 otherwise
IRBic Dummy variable that equals 1 for IRB banks and 0 for the Standardized ones
NCOict Net charge offs scaled by beginning of the year total assets in Equations (2)
and (3), and scaled by beginning market value of equity (market capitaliza-
tion), obtained from Datastream, in Equation (4)
Lossict Indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise
Rict Annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t+1,
obtained from Datastream
GDP Growthct Annual rate of change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product
∆Unemploymentct Annual change in country-specific unemployment
HPIct Country-specific House Price Index (HPI) return obtained from the European
Central Bank (ECB) for the EU, and Case Shiller Index for the U.S.
Term Spreadct Country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest rates,
obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB)
In the entire table, i stands for bank, c for country and t for year.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Bank level variables Standardized banks IRB banks U.S. sample
(N. Obs=191) (N. Obs=347) (N. Obs=311)
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
LLP 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.012
EBPT 0.017 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.014
Loan 0.600 0.152 0.551 0.159 0.692 0.137
∆Loan 0.072 0.091 0.051 0.077 0.048 0.117
NPL 0.037 0.032 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.025
∆NPL 0.007 0.023 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.029
Loss 0.089 0.285 0.121 0.327 0.299 0.459
Size 9.109 1.301 11.476 1.915 5.083 0.940
Growth 0.091 0.162 0.073 0.152 0.085 0.181
Tier 1 10.606 3.094 9.363 2.526 13.622 3.034
NCO 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.012
Obtained from Equation (1)
DLLP -0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.006
Positive DLLP 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
Negative DLLP -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.005
Scaled by market capitalization for Equation (4)
(N. Obs=190) (N. Obs=312) (N. Obs=311)
R -0.186 0.628 -0.159 0.702 -0.163 0.386
EBPT 0.164 0.150 0.188 0.163 0.070 0.159
NPL 0.493 0.770 0.425 0.645 0.207 0.488
∆NPL 0.115 0.305 0.121 0.291 0.064 0.357
NCO 0.009 0.078 0.017 0.074 0.070 0.175
Country level variables
GDP Growth 0.879 2.759
∆Unemployment 0.095 0.223
House Price Index -1.651 6.416
Term Spread 1.545 2.318
LLP is defined as loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; EBPT is earnings before taxes
and loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; Loan is loans scaled by beginning total
assets; ∆Loan is change in loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL is non-performing loans scaled
by beginning total assets; ∆NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets;
Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise; Size is the natural
logarithm of beginning total assets; Growth is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the
end of year t; Tier 1 is the ratio of regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) before loan loss reserves to the
minimum required regulatory capital; NCO is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets; R is
the annual return from April 1st to March 31st from Datastream. DLLP are the discretionary loan
loss provisions, computed as the residuals of the regression of LLPs on their normal determinants,
as per Equation (1). We further distinguish between positive (income-decreasing) and negative
(income-decreasing) DLLPs, that we use as dependent variables in Equation (2); GDP Growth is
the annual rate of change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product; ∆Unemployment is annual
change in country-specific unemployment; House Price Index is country-specific House Price Index
(HPI) return obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB) for the EU, and Case Shiller Index for
the U.S.; Term Spread is the country-specific difference between short-term and long-term interest
rates, obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB).
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Table 4: Correlation matrix
LLP EBPT Loan ∆Loan NPL ∆NPL Loss Size Growth Tier 1 Basel IRB NCO
LLP
EBPT 0.1263
Loan 0.2948 0.1315
∆Loan −0.2357 0.3862 0.0194
NPL 0.4633 0.0083 0.2368 −0.0555
∆NPL 0.6147 0.0750 0.2020 −0.1539 0.1476
Loss 0.4084 −0.4116 0.0262 −0.2678 0.2949 0.2605
Size −0.1630 −0.2853 −0.2668 −0.2130 −0.3910 −0.1322 −0.0341
Growth −0.0782 0.3081 0.0248 0.6547 −0.0929 −0.0207 −0.1826 −0.1019
Tier 1 0.0124 0.2934 −0.2307 −0.0521 0.0797 −0.0489 0.0026 −0.3187 0.0345
Basel 0.2675 −0.2773 0.1182 −0.4750 0.1632 0.2036 0.2067 −0.0042 −0.4007 0.1050
IRB −0.0600 −0.1590 −0.1482 −0.1221 −0.2468 −0.0322 0.0491 0.5502 −0.0555 −0.2124 0.0374
NCO 0.0997 0.0844 −0.0202 −0.0197 0.0205 −0.0396 0.0177 0.1325 0.0441 0.1277 −0.0416 0.0151
R −0.0749 0.1812 −0.0949 −0.0793 −0.0747 0.0169 −0.1955 0.0039 −0.0240 0.0788 −0.1140 0.0292 0.0169
LLP is defined as loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; EBPT is earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets; Loan
is loans scaled by beginning total assets; ∆Loan is change in loans scaled by beginning total assets; NPL is non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets;
∆NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets; Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise; Size is the
natural logarithm of beginning total assets; Growth is the growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of year t; Tier 1 is the ratio of regulatory capital (Tier
1 capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital; Basel is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period after the bank adopted Basel
II and 0 otherwise; IRB is a a dummy variable that equals 1 for the IRB banks and 0 for the Standardized ones; NCO is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total
assets; R is the annual return from April 1st to March 31st from Datastream.
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Table 5: Estimation of the non-discretionary component of LLPs
Loan Loss Provisions
Whole sample Years 2008 & 2011 excluded
(1) (2)
NPL 0.1009** 0.0979**
(0.020) (0.031)
∆NPL 0.2411** 0.1904**
(0.061) (0.051)
Loans 0.0056** 0.0056**
(0.002) (0.002)
∆Loans -0.0130** -0.0122**
(0.004) (0.004)
NCO 0.2187* 0.1349
(0.110) (0.071)
Constant -0.0012 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 538 362
R-squared 0.560 0.565
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
The regression model is:
LLPict = θ0 + θ1NPLict + θ2∆NPLict + θ3Loanict + θ4∆Loanict + θ5NCOict + εict (1)
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLPict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning
total assets, NPLict and ∆NPLict are non-performing loans and their first difference, respectively
scaled by beginning total assets, Loanict and ∆Loanict, are loans and their first difference, respec-
tively scaled by beginning total assets, NCOict is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets,
and εict is a residual.
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Table 6: The impact of Basel II on banks’ income-increasing and income-decreasing DLLPs.
Whole sample Year 2008 & 2011 excluded
Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
DLLP DLLP DLLP DLLP DLLP DLLP DLLP DLLP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basel 0.0014** 0.0005 0.0010 0.0000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Basel*IRB -0.0011* -0.0011 -0.0011* -0.0010 -0.0011* -0.0004 -0.0011* -0.0004
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LLP (lagged) -0.1154** 0.2349** -0.0619 0.2008* -0.0334 0.3749** -0.0465 0.3734**
(0.042) (0.065) (0.046) (0.079) (0.054) (0.082) (0.056) (0.093)
EBPT 0.0848** 0.1244 0.0936** 0.1544 0.1866** 0.1366 0.1850** 0.1297
(0.032) (0.077) (0.032) (0.079) (0.043) (0.073) (0.043) (0.072)
Loss 0.0011* 0.0055** 0.0010 0.0050** 0.0019* 0.0005 0.0018* 0.0007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 0.0009 -0.0027 0.0016 -0.0050 0.0014 -0.0020 0.0013 -0.0045
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Growth 0.0028* 0.0001 0.0029* -0.0012 0.0027* -0.0029 0.0029* -0.0037
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Tier1 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth -0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Unemployment 0.0003 0.0009 0.0014 0.0034 0.0016 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0004
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant -0.0127 0.0271 -0.0205 0.0516 -0.0184 0.0219 -0.0166 0.0482*
(0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.029) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024)
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 305 233 305 233 203 159 203 159
R-squared 0.161 0.284 0.206 0.317 0.259 0.398 0.276 0.438
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The regression model is:
DLLPict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4LLPic,t−1 + θ5EBPTict + θ6Lossict + θ7Sizeict
+θ8Growthict + θ9Tier1ict + θ10GDP Growthct
+θ11∆Unemploymentct + γt + δi + εict,
(2)
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, DLLPict are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of Equation (1), Baselt
is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRBi is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of
Basel II, LLPic,t−1 is lagged LLP scaled by beginning total assets, EBPTict is lagged earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by
beginning total assets, Lossict is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Sizeict is bank size, measured
as the log of beginning total assets, Growthict is the growth rate of total assets, Tier1ict is Tier 1 capital scaled by beginning total
assets, GDP Growthct is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemploymentct is the annual change in
country-specific unemployment, γt is a time effect, δi is a bank fixed effect, and εict is a residual. Baselt and IRBi are included in the
equation for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ1 and θ2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects, and year
dummies in the estimations that include them.
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Table 7: Impact of Basel II on Income Smoothing
Loan Loss Provisions
Whole sample Years 2008 & 2011 excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basel*IRB 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
EBPT 0.0715 0.0705 0.0694 0.0803 0.0550 0.0715
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070)
Basel*EBPT 0.1482* 0.1492* 0.1502* 0.1569* 0.1891** 0.1648*
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
IRB*EBPT 0.1150 0.1146 0.1148 0.1084 0.1091 0.1090
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
Basel*IRB*EBPT -0.1922* -0.1921* -0.1917* -0.2153* -0.2070* -0.2049*
(0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086)
Loans 0.0082* 0.0081* 0.0081* -0.0056 -0.0043 -0.0061
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Loans -0.0081* -0.0080* -0.0080* -0.0105** -0.0093* -0.0100**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NPL 0.2212** 0.2209** 0.2210** 0.2174** 0.2154** 0.2151**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
∆NPL 0.1985** 0.1985** 0.1985** 0.1493** 0.1493** 0.1481**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Size -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tier1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Unemployment 0.0054** 0.0054** 0.0054** 0.0058** 0.0059** 0.0058**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HPI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Term Spread 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.0077** -0.0038 -0.0041 0.0022 0.0137 0.0184
(0.003) (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.017) (0.017)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 538 538 538 362 362 362
R-squared 0.643 0.644 0.644 0.682 0.679 0.683
Basel*EBPT + Basel*IRB*EBPT=0 0.567 0.529 0.477 1.105 0.0963 0.468
P-value 0.452 0.467 0.490 0.294 0.757 0.495
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
The regression model is:
LLPict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4EBPTict + θ5Baselt · EBPTict + θ6IRBi · EBPTict + θ7Baselt · IRBi · EBPTict
+θ8NPLict + θ9∆NPLict + θ10Loanict + θ11∆Loanict + θ12NCOict
+θ13Tier1ict + θ14Sizeict + θ15GDP Growthct
+θ16∆Unemploymentct + θ17HPIct + θ17Term Spreadct + γt + δi + εict.
(3)
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, LLPict stands for loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets, Baselt is a dummy for
the post-Basel II adoption period, IRBi is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, EBPTict
is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets, NPLict and ∆NPLict are non-performing loans and their first
difference, respectively scaled by beginning total assets, Loanict and ∆Loanict, are loans and their first difference, respectively scaled
by beginning total assets, NCOict is net charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets, Tier1ict is Tier 1 capital scaled by beginning
total assets, Sizeict is bank size, measured as the log of beginning total assets, GDP Growthct is the annual change in country-specific
Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemploymentct is the annual change in country-specific unemployment, HPIct is the country-specific
House Price Index (HPI) return obtained from the European Central Bank, Term Spreadct is the country-specific difference between
short-term and long-term interest rates, γt is a time effect, δi is a bank fixed effect, and εict is a residual. Baselt and IRBi are included
in the equation for completeness of the DiD effect, but the θ1 and θ2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects, and
year dummies.
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Table 8: The association between DLLPs and returns
Returns
Year 2008 excluded Years 2008 & 2011 excluded
(1) (2) (3)
Basel 0.2146 0.4382**
(0.130) (0.136)
Basel*IRB 0.0260 -0.0064 0.0640
(0.155) (0.107) (0.167)
DLLP 0.7379 -2.7807 5.5756
(4.009) (2.770) (4.296)
Basel*DLLP 0.6403 1.5738 2.3792
(3.416) (2.354) (3.466)
IRB*DLLP 4.8257 -4.9095 -5.2080
(12.611) (8.725) (12.268)
Basel*IRB*DLLP 30.5661** 17.5741* 22.7863*
(11.770) (8.145) (10.993)
EBPT 3.3878** 1.8507** 3.2537**
(0.579) (0.410) (0.620)
Basel*EBPT -1.5427* -1.0232* -2.0892**
(0.629) (0.438) (0.638)
IRB*EBPT -1.0972 -0.9840 -0.9736
(0.730) (0.511) (0.776)
Basel*IRB*EBPT 0.6095 0.8120 0.6208
(0.819) (0.572) (0.833)
∆NPL 0.0064 -0.1633* 0.1004
(0.098) (0.069) (0.103)
EBPT 3.3878** 1.8507** 3.2537**
(0.579) (0.410) (0.620)
NCO -0.9379* -0.3262 -0.0078
(0.443) (0.308) (0.494)
Constant -0.4748** -0.0040 -0.4562**
(0.092) (0.078) (0.090)
Year dummies No Yes No
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 415 415 333
R-squared 0.297 0.670 0.361
F-test: Basel*DLLP+Basel*IRB*DLLP=0 7.53 5.93 5.7
P-value 0.0064 0.0155 0.0178
F-test: Basel*EBPT+Basel*IRB*EBPT=0 1.73 0.17 4.52
P-value 0.1899 0.6808 0.0346
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
The regression model is:
Rict =θ0 + θ1Baselt + θ2IRBi + θ3Baselt · IRBi
+θ4DLLPict + θ5Baselt · DLLPict + θ6IRBi · DLLPict + θ7Baselt · IRBi · DLLPict
+θ8EBPTict + θ9Baselt · EBTPict + θ10IRBi · EBTPict + θ11Baselt · IRBi · EBTPict
+θ12∆NPLict + θ13NCOict + γt + δi + εict,
(4)
where, for bank i, year t, and country c, Rict is the annual stock return measured from April 1 of year t to March 31 of year t+1, Baselt
is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRBi is a dummy for banks that employ the IRB methodology after the adoption of
Basel II, DLLPict are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of of the LLP equation, EBPTict is earnings before
provisions and taxes scaled by market value of total equity (market capitalization), ∆NPLict is non-performing loans scaled by market
value of total equity (market capitalization), NCOict is net charge-offs scaled by market value of total equity (market capitalization),
γt is a time effect, δi is a bank fixed effect, and εict is a residual. Baselt and IRBi are included in the equation for completeness of
the DiD effect, but the θ1 and θ2 parameters are subsumed, respectively, by bank fixed effects, and year dummies in the estimations
that include them.
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Table 9: All estimations with U.S. control group
DLLPs Income Smoothing Market Valuation
Negative Positive Loan Loss Provision Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basel 0.2912**
(0.0627)
Basel*IRB -0.0016* -0.0077 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0106 -0.0796
(0.0007) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.1318) (0.1191)
EBPT 0.0858* -0.0222 -0.1837 -0.1817 0.2472 0.5333
(0.0347) (0.1084) (0.1173) (0.1174) (0.7397) (0.6512)
Basel*EBPT 0.2190 0.2122 0.0951 0.0383
(0.1205) (0.1211) (0.7186) (0.6317)
IRB*EBPT 0.3528* 0.3438* 3.3189** 1.5319
(0.1601) (0.1609) (0.9883) (0.8884)
Basel*IRB*EBPT -0.3191* -0.3043* -1.8499 -0.8040
(0.1524) (0.1544) (0.9774) (0.8756)
LLP (lagged) 0.0094 -0.3057**
(0.0275) (0.0984)
Loss 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0007) (0.0026)
Loans 0.0024 0.0027
(0.0056) (0.0056)
∆Loans -0.0160** -0.0165**
(0.0036) (0.0037)
NPL 0.2401** 0.2408**
(0.0213) (0.0214)
∆NPL 0.1511** 0.1515** 0.0661 0.0577
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0668) (0.0598)
Tier 1 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Size 0.0022 -0.0094 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0013) (0.0048) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Growth 0.0012 -0.0062
(0.0016) (0.0046)
DLLP 0.1808 -3.4607
(18.0733) (15.8906)
Basel*DLLP -2.0398 -9.1184
(18.3893) (16.2031)
IRB*DLLP -17.6488 -16.7954
(22.9434) (20.1685)
Basel*IRB*DLLP 15.0839 23.0112
(23.9671) (21.0843)
NCO -0.8486** -0.8408**
(0.1622) (0.1430)
GDP Growth -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆Unemployment -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0039 0.0033
(0.0013) (0.0067) (0.0027) (0.0029)
HPI -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant -0.0242* 0.0807* -0.0212 -0.0228 -0.4494** 0.1371
(0.0113) (0.0397) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0600) (0.0714)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333 213 658 658 512 512
R2 0.329 0.193 0.396 0.396 0.317 0.477
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table shows estimation results for Equations (2), (3), and (4) when
we use U.S. commercial banks as a control group. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are respectively income-increasing
and income-decreasing DLLPs. Income smoothing results are shown in Columns (3) and (4), where LLPs are the dependent variable,
and Columns (5) and (6) show market valuation results where the dependent variable is the annual stock return measured from April
1 of year t to March 31 of year t+ 1. Basel is a dummy for the post-Basel II adoption period, IRB is a dummy for banks that employ
the IRB methodology after the adoption of Basel II, EBPT is earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by beginning total assets in
Columns (3) and (4) and by market value of total equity (market capitalization) in Columns (5) and (6), LLP (lagged) are lagged loan
loss provisions, scaled by beginning total assets in Columns (3) and (4) and by market value of total equity (market capitalization)
in Columns (5) and (6), Loss is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise, Loan and ∆Loan, are loans
and their first difference, respectively scaled by beginning total assets, NPL is non-performing loans scaled by beginning total assets,
∆NPL is change in non-performing loans scaled by market value of total equity (market capitalization), Tier 1 is Tier 1 capital scaled
by beginning total assets, Size is bank size, measured as the log of beginning total assets, Growth is the growth rate of total assets,
DLLP are discretionary loan loss provisions, obtained as the residual of Equation (1), NCO is net charge-offs scaled by market value of
total equity (market capitalization), GDP Growth is the annual change in country-specific Gross Domestic Product, ∆Unemployment
is the annual change in country-specific unemployment.
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